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Abstract
Humans have become increasingly datafied with the use of digital technologies that generate information with and about
their bodies and everyday lives. The onto-epistemological dimensions of human–data assemblages and their relationship
to bodies and selves have yet to be thoroughly theorised. In this essay, I draw on key perspectives espoused in feminist
materialism, vital materialism and the anthropology of material culture to examine the ways in which these assemblages
operate as part of knowing, perceiving and sensing human bodies. I draw particularly on scholarship that employs organic
metaphors and concepts of vitality, growth, making, articulation, composition and decomposition. I show how these
metaphors and concepts relate to and build on each other, and how they can be applied to think through humans’
encounters with their digital data. I argue that these theoretical perspectives work to highlight the material and
embodied dimensions of human–data assemblages as they grow and are enacted, articulated and incorporated into
everyday lives.
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Introduction
An expanding array of technologies is directed at moni-
toring aspects of human lives and rendering them into
digital datasets. People’s encounters and interactions
with digital technologies generate reams of digitised
information about their bodies, habits, preferences
and social relationships. This information is often
referred to as ‘small data’ because it is about individ-
uals rather than large populations. When they are
aggregated, however, small data become Big Data. In
the contexts of everyday lives, the voluminous personal
data that are continually and automatically generated
contribute to larger datasets about people than they
have ever experienced. From their perspective, there-
fore, these data are ‘big’, posing the problem of how
best to interpret and make use of them, and come to
terms with how others may be using the data. Many of
these data traces are collected, accessed and exploited
by other actors and agencies, often without people’s
knowledge or consent. In some cases, however, people
can view and use the data thus produced about them.
They may choose to actively collect digitised
information about themselves using devices and soft-
ware speciﬁcally designed for this purpose, such as
self-tracking apps, platforms and wearable devices.
People can also sometimes review data about them-
selves collected by other actors, such as social media
metrics, employee dashboards, educational outcomes,
medical records and so on.
These technologies work to capture and materialise
immanent dimensions of human embodiment, creating
human–data assemblages. Unlike previous forms of
digitised bodily informatics, which were often conﬁned
to medical domains and trained experts, many novel
digital technologies oﬀer any interested person the
opportunity to document, monitor and measure details
of their bodies. When bodily processes are monitored
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by digital sensors and rendered into digital data, they
are made visible in unprecedented ways. Elements of
their bodies that people may not otherwise have con-
sidered to any great extent – the number of steps they
take per day, their sleep patterns, the kilometres and
geographical locations they move through, their brain
waves, moods and so on – are brought into sharp relief.
Digital monitoring practices tend to position the
body as a data repository, with speciﬁc digital sensors
and other monitoring devices used to target various
parts or functions of the body to uncover and extract
the information contained within so that it may be ren-
dered useful (Amoore and Hall, 2009; Berson, 2015;
Grinberg, 2017; Lupton, 2016b, 2017a). The body
becomes a series of interrelating digitised informatics,
which demand new ways of interpreting these signs and
signals of bodily function and movement. In these situ-
ations, people can be confronted with making sense of
the information, deciding how valid or valuable it is,
and deciding how best to incorporate their data into
their lives. They are called on to know their bodies
better and more intensely, and to work to interpret
these novel forms of information about themselves –
to engage in data sense-making (Lupton, 2017b, 2017c).
The onto-epistemological dimensions of these assem-
blages and their relationship to human bodies and
selves have yet to be thoroughly theorised. A growing
literature has emerged under the rubric of critical data
studies, examining and critiquing the role of digital
data in everyday lives and social institutions. Several
researchers in this area of scholarship have adopted a
sociomaterialist perspective, acknowledging the co-con-
stitutive relationship between humans, digital technol-
ogies and data (for example, Gabrys et al., 2016;
Kitchin, 2014; Kitchin and Lauriault, 2014; Ruppert
et al., 2017; Tahani, 2016; Tanweer et al., 2016). Thus
far, however, only a small number have taken up this
approach to consider how people make sense of their
personal data (Michael and Lupton, 2016) or employed
perspectives from feminist materialism, vital material-
ism and the anthropology of material culture. I argue
that these issues and perspectives are key to developing
a critical data studies that recognises that data about
people can be experienced as ‘big’ in the contexts of
people’s everyday lives – as ‘personal Big Data’ –
rather than simply anonymous, decontextualised large
datasets used by institutional and corporate actors.
In this essay, I seek to build on and extend my pre-
vious theoretical and empirical research addressing how
people respond to and make sense of their personal
data. In so doing, I position these assemblages as
things which are made and used by humans, involving
processes of articulation and improvisation. Some key
perspectives expressed in feminist materialism, vital
materialism and the anthropology of material culture,
and particularly those that employ organic metaphors
and concepts, are drawn on to make these arguments.
I show how these metaphors and concepts relate to and
build on each other, and how they can be applied to
think through humans’ encounters with digital data
about themselves. While this essay is designed to
focus primarily on conceptual development, I refer
to some examples from my own and others’ empirical
studies to illustrate some of my arguments.
Data sense and lively data
The terms ‘data sense’ or ‘data sensing/sense-making’
have been used previously in various contexts, to
denote a range of phenomena and practices. Because
of their association with nonhuman entities such as
digital devices and software, and because they are
often viewed as non-material entities, digital data are
often de-humanised and de-materialised in discourses.
They are also often individualised, so that discussions
of how people collect and make sense of their own data
can be reduced to models of cognition or behavioural
psychology. In information studies, the concept of data
sense-making is closely related to those of information
or data literacy. It refers to the ways in which people
engage with and learn from information (Frank et al.,
2016; Wolﬀ et al., 2016). This perspective draws mainly
on literatures in informatics, education and informa-
tion literacy research, using the analogy of literacy as
the ability to read: that is, understand and use text. For
example, in their deﬁnition, Wolﬀ et al. (2016: 23)
describe data literacy skills as ‘abilities to select,
clean, analyse, visualise, critique and interpret data,
as well as to communicate stories from data and to
use data as part of a design process’.
More than a decade ago, Kang and Cuﬀ (2005)
referred to ‘datasense’ as part of their predictions
about the rapidly-expanding world of digital sensors
and the data generated from online interactions. They
used the metaphor of the ‘digital nervous system
grafted onto the material world’ (Kang and Cuﬀ,
2005: 112) to describe potential interactions between
digital technologies that could occur without human
intervention (relationships that are now often referred
to as the Internet of Things). Their approach, therefore,
focused on nonhuman sensing and communication of
information, rather than humans’ interactions with
digital data. Data Sense is also the title of a website
featuring a research experiment run by Intel Labs,
which involves a tool built by the company directed
at making personal data easier to manipulate and ana-
lyse by people who are not expert in programming. It
also takes a data literacy approach (Intel, 2017: 139).
These accounts of data sense-making often focus
on cognitive or technical forms of data interpretation.
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The role of the emplaced, sensory body in communica-
tive and pedagogical activities – or how people live with
their data – is often ignored. Despite personal data
becoming increasingly generated by, on and with the
human body, the interplay between the human senses
and the digital sensors that work to document the body
tends not to receive attention. The concept of data
sense, as I seek to develop it here, brings the body
back in, acknowledging that we learn in and through
our bodies. It incorporates the entanglements of the
digital sensors with the human senses in the process
of sense-making (Lupton, 2017b; Lupton et al., 2018).
In these enactments, bodies are not only knowing and
perceiving (Latimer, 2008), but they are sensing,
responding to and assessing the information returned
by digital sensors. Data sense, therefore, may be con-
ceptualised as the co-constitution of human and nonhu-
man sense-making.
I have previously proposed that one way of concep-
tualising digital data assemblages (which bring together
humans-devices-software-data-space-time) is thinking
of them metaphorically as ‘lively’ (Lupton, 2017b,
2017c, 2018b; Lupton et al., 2018) When ﬁrst develop-
ing the concept of lively data, I drew on sociological
discussions concerning the constant generation, circu-
lation and recombination of digital data through
people’s online interactions and the implications for
social research (Beer, 2013; Beer and Burrows, 2013;
Savage, 2013). I have sought to extend the concept
with speciﬁc reference to the implications of digital
data about human bodies and lives, noting that such
data possess other vital capacities because they are
about human life itself, have implications for human
life opportunities and livelihoods, can have recursive
eﬀects on human lives (shaping action and concepts
of embodiment and selfhood) and generate economic
value. I have also considered the notion of understand-
ing personal digital data as companion species, drawing
on Haraway’s work (2003) on companion animals
to position these data as co-evolving with their
human progenitors (Lupton, 2016a). As I demonstrate
below, further concepts and perspectives from
Haraway’s more recent work, as well as those oﬀered
by other feminist and vital materialists, and by anthro-
pologists of material culture, provide greater depth and
nuance to these arguments, particularly those involving
vitality, growth, making, articulation, composition and
decomposition.
Vital capacities and human–nonhuman
assemblages
Recent feminist material perspectives have become
inﬂuential in sociomaterialist scholarship. Donna
Haraway and Karen Barad are key ﬁgures here. Both
view humans as assemblages of human and nonhuman
actors, in which humans can never be separated from
the environments in and through which they move.
Haraway (Franklin and Haraway, 2017; Haraway,
2003, 2008), for example, has proclaimed in her recent
work that she rejects the idea of the posthuman, pre-
ferring to position humans as compost, intertwined
with companion species of other living and nonhuman
entities. For her part, Barad calls for a perspective on
the human in which bodies are discursive as they enact
practice, and therefore ‘matter and meaning are mutu-
ally articulated’ (2007: 152). Barad (2003) draws atten-
tion to the importance of focusing attention on how
boundaries between phenomena are enacted, always
involving choices about exclusions as well as inclusions.
The practices of making these distinctions (including
discursive practices which delimit what can be said),
which are continuous and dynamic, are part of
agency: ‘Agency is not an attribute but the ongoing
reconﬁgurings of the world’ (Barad, 2003: 818). Barad
(2003) further notes that humans do not know about
the world because they are observing from outside it.
Rather, they know the world because they are insepar-
ably part of it. Epistemology and ontology cannot,
therefore, be separated. ‘Onto-epistem-ology – the
study of practices of knowing in being – is probably a
better way to think about the kind of understandings
that are needed’ (Barad, 2003: 829). For Barad (2003),
a key question is ‘understanding how matter comes
to matter’.
The vital materialism perspective takes up some of
these issues, directing particular attention to the lively
agencies of nonhumans as well as humans, including
non-organic actors such as technologies (Bennett,
2004, 2010). The emergent, unpredictable, non-linear
and dynamic nature of materialist enactments is again
emphasised in this literature, which builds on the work
of many social theorists, including Spinoza, Foucault,
Deleuze, Merleau-Ponty, Latour and Bourdieu. This
approach also refuses a dualistic approach to agency
and matter and focuses attention on the ways in
which actors are inextricably entangled, together gen-
erating vitality (Bennett, 2004, 2010; Coole, 2013).
Bennett’s concept of ‘thing-power’, or ‘the curious abil-
ity of inanimate things to animate, to act, to product
eﬀects dramatic and subtle’ (2004: 351) is important in
emphasising the vibrant agential capacities of human–
nonhuman assemblages. Thing-power is a dynamic
ﬂow of energy between and with the components of
assemblages. Bennett argues that the concept of
thing-power emphasises the intimacy of humans
and nonhumans, the ways that they are so closely
intertwined in the moments when ‘human being and
thinghood overlap’ (2004: 349). She further elaborates
that thing-power is not located in one speciﬁc object
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alone, but rather is a function of the grouping of
diﬀerent things in an assemblage, each operating in
conjunction with the others (including humans)
(Bennett, 2004: 354).
The ethnographic and historical scholarship of Tim
Ingold and his collaborator Elizabeth Hallam, both
anthropologists who write about material cultures,
also contribute to concepts of perceiving and learning
as part of embodied practices with lively objects. Ingold
and Hallam have written about processes of making
and living with things, emphasising the role of creativ-
ity, improvisation and learning by doing. In his book
Making (2013), Ingold focuses his ethnographic ana-
lyses on the practices involved in making objects, and
how learning is part of these processes. Using the
organic metaphor of growing, Ingold connects embodi-
ment and learning. He argues that: ‘the only way one
can really know things – that is, from the very inside of
one’s being – is through a process of self-discovery.
To know things you have to grow into them, and let
them grow in you, so that they become a part of who
you are’ (Ingold, 2013: 1).
This perspective goes well beyond the idea that
information generates knowledge or self-understand-
ing. It focuses on lived practices and how they develop
and change over time. Learning is viewed as a continu-
ing process, therefore, rather than a ﬁxed-term event,
and one which involves acts of making, improvisation
and adjusting to change. It is also a profoundly embo-
died experience, not just located in cognition. Ingold
argues that when artisans are making things, they are
not working on them, but rather with them. He con-
tends that making is a process of correspondence, in
which artisans seek to draw forth the potentials of
matter: ‘In the act of making the artisan couples his
[sic] own movements and gestures – indeed his very
life – with the becoming of his materials, joining with
and following the forces and ﬂows that bring his work
to fruition’ (Ingold, 2013: 31).
Ingold (2013) contends that material artefacts are
never ﬁxed or completed. Because they are open to
new meanings and uses, they are always in a process
of becoming something else. As they move into new or
diﬀerent contexts, artefacts change in meaning, even if
not always in shape. With Hallam, he discusses the
emergent properties of artefacts, emphasising the new
ways in which artefacts can be used and re-used and
change during the process. Just as making and learning
are never ﬁnished, artefacts ‘pass from one form of life
to another’ (Ingold and Hallam, 2014: 2). They empha-
sise that growing things need not be only living things,
using the examples of minerals deposits and crystals.
Growth, indeed, is ‘the fundamental condition of
beings and things in a world that is always surpassing
itself’ (Ingold and Hallam, 2014: 3).
The anthropology of material culture has also
included some reﬂections on the decay and degradation
of artefacts and the potentials that this process creates.
In her empirical scholarship, Hallam (2010; 2016) has
focused predominantly on how dead bodies or other
human remains (such as bones) have been portrayed
and used in the context of museum anatomical displays,
as artefacts for leaning. She examines their contribu-
tions to ﬁelds of knowledge, and how these displays
are creatively made. As she notes, anatomical displays
of human bodies ‘cut across the categories of the
organic and artefactual’ (Hallam, 2016: 8). Hallam
(2010,2016) uses the term ‘articulation’ to describe the
ways in which various actors seek to make sense of
parts of human bodies they are working with. For
example, articulation refers both to how bones from a
speciﬁc skeleton can be ﬁtted together and how bones
can be used and inserted into a range of diverse narra-
tives and social relations, depending on the context.
Bones, she argues, are relational entities. They have
diﬀerent meanings based on the historical, political
and physical settings in which they are located, and
the intentions of the human actors working to make
sense of them: whether these are archaeologists, biolo-
gists, artists, historians, relatives or many other poten-
tial actors.
As Hallam (2010, 2016) points out, bones have been
used in a multitude of ways as decorative, artistic or
religious artefacts. While commonly thought of as
‘dead’, therefore, human bones are very much alive,
in terms of their changing meanings and uses and the
capacity they possess to arouse aﬀect and action. They
can be moved into very diﬀerent contexts and take on
diﬀerent agential capacities. Thus, for example, human
bones can be exhumed, reburied, turned into powder,
brought into an art or museum exhibition: each time
developing new meanings. The material properties of
human bones facilitate many forms of display for
mourning, commemorative, political, religious, sym-
bolic, historical, heritage, decorative and artistic
purposes.
There are several related themes that emerge in all
these scholars’ work. All adopt a more-than-human
approach, which demands that the human subject is
always considered permeable and open to the material
world rather than closed-oﬀ and contained. Hallam’s
concept of articulation draws attention to the work
involved in bringing human remains together, the
multifarious ways in which this may be achieved and
the consequent vitality of the meanings and capacities
these remains can take on. Ingold and Hallam (2014)
point out that an inevitable part of growth is decom-
position and decay. Out of this rotting of matter springs
new matter, continuing the growth cycle. So too, in
taking up vital materialism, Frost argues for a concept
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of humans as ‘biocultural creatures’ which are ‘con-
stantly composing, decomposing, and recomposing in
response to their engagement with their habitats’ (2016:
149). This notion of composition, and re/decompos-
ition builds on Haraway’s ‘we are all compost’ meta-
phor (Franklin and Haraway, 2017), usefully
emphasising the dynamic nature of these processes.
Here again, vitality and agential capacities can be
considered key to the ways in which humans respond
to the elements of the environments with which they
form assemblages. According to Frost (2016: 153), the
‘cultural’ dimension of biocultural creatures is repre-
sentational, political and social but also biological, tem-
poral and spatial. Together these dimensions work to
compose and de/recompose humans, providing the con-
ditions in which they live, move and grow (or are ‘cul-
tured’, as Frost puts it). Humans, in turn, make and
remake their habits through their continued presence in
them and through intentional and unintentional adjust-
ments they make to them. De/recomposition takes
place in diﬀerent ways and timescales for humans,
from the micro-level of the cells to the macro-level of
movement of the body through space. There are con-
straints on how humans respond to their environments
that delimit what they can and cannot do and in what
transformations they participate (Frost, 2016).
To summarise, the following themes are evident in
the work of the sociomaterial perspectives I have dis-
cussed thus far:
. an approach that recognises that humans and non-
humans are entangled in hybrid, unstable and gen-
erative ways;
. the importance of considering the distributed agency
and vital capacities (‘thing-power’) of human–non-
human assemblages;
. an emphasis on the embodied, sensory and otherwise
material nature of meaning, knowing, growing, per-
ceiving and making as part of human embodiment;
. the changing meanings of artefacts as they move into
diﬀerent assemblages and the work required to
articulate these assemblages; and
. the importance of identifying and tracing the ways in
which humans and nonhumans are intermeshed, the
enactments and practices that are involved, and the
eﬀects of these on human lives.
All these approaches use organic metaphors and
concepts to think through the nature of human–nonhu-
man assemblages. These metaphors and concepts draw
attention to the vibrancy, hybrid and emergent nature
of these assemblages. They can contribute to new ways
of conceptualising human–data assemblages and how
people incorporate data into their bodies and lives,
as the next section demonstrates.
How do personal digital data
come to matter?
The concept of the human–data assemblage works to
highlight the distributed and dynamic nature of subject-
ivity and embodiment that sociomaterial perspectives
emphasise. The onto-epistemological problem posed
by human–data assemblages requires humans to inter-
pret what aspects of themselves these assemblages
diﬀerentiate. Data and humans can potentially learn
from each other and co-evolve. But humans may ﬁnd
themselves asking to what extent their data speak for
them, and to what extent their data are diﬀerent from
other elements of embodiment and selfhood. Making
sense of personal data requires developing practices
that can manage and interpret lively data to make
them useful and knowable.
The sine qua non of digital devices and software
designed for generating personalised data about their
users is making the information they produce intelli-
gible to the users: making themselves known at the
same time as they generate knowledge about users.
From the sociomaterialist perspective, data about
humans and humans are always part of each other
and emerge together. Just as it can be claimed that
authors and books write each other (Barad, 2007: x):
it can also be asserted that people and their data make
each other. The idea that personal data assemblages
co-evolve with and are companion species to humans
also acknowledges this (Lupton, 2016a). To the meta-
phor of lively data assemblages, Ingold’s theorising of
becoming, growing and learning can readily be incor-
porated. Ideas about the vitality of things drawn from
Bennett can contribute to the concept of lively data and
its implications for human embodiment.
The notion, from Barad, of matter and how it comes
to matter, directs us to think about digital data as a
form of matter and to focus attention on the ways in
which they aﬀect human lives. The value of personal
data for people’s lives, and the ways they make sense
of the data, involve complex interactions between
embodied sensory knowledge and information that is
generated from digital devices and online interactions.
Knowing, as Barad (2003) puts it, is one body making
itself intelligible to another body. These human–data
assemblages are conﬁgured within broader networks
and environments which again are mutually articulated
and co-constitutive. People can make decisions from
the constantly changing choices available about what
words they use to describe phenomena and what mater-
ial practices they engage in to generate or interact with
phenomena.
Hallam’s discussions of the lively capacities of
human bones also have much to oﬀer an ontology of
digital data about humans. Like human bones, digital
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data only make sense in the contexts in which they are
located. Like human bones, they have inﬁnite capacities
for taking on new meaning. It is this very vitality on
which the claims of self-tracking enthusiasts often rest,
in terms of its imputed power to change and optimise
human bodies and lives (Lupton, 2016b). However, the
vitality of human data also presents a great challenge to
growing and learning with them. The tools used to
digitally generate and materialise personal data are by
necessity reductive and normative, as well as generative.
If the metaphor of lively data is employed, we can begin
to think about conceptualising what happens when
these data are not found to be useful, insightful or
otherwise valuable for the people who are engaging
with them. The data are frozen in a state of material-
isation for a time, inviting recognition (Lupton, 2017b).
Barad (2003: 828) uses the alternative term ‘the con-
gealing of agency’ to describe the doing and making
of matter. If they remain inert (are not enlivened by
further movements and uses), it is interesting to exam-
ine why this is the case. Personal data can have agentive
capacities that shape people’s embodied responses and
actions, their sense of selfhood and their relationships
with other people and with other things. In other
words, they have the ‘thing-power’ that Bennett
describes (Lupton, 2018a).
The potential for digital data to decompose (and
then potentially recomposed) also requires consider-
ation in the context of lively data and data sense.
‘Broken world thinking’ (Houston et al., 2016;
Jackson and Kang, 2014) directs attention to the inher-
ent instability of digital technologies and infrastruc-
tures, and the resultant need for continual repair. The
terms ‘degradation’ and ‘decay’ are employed to
describe these processes, which call for constant
ﬁxing, improvising and reinvention – act of repair –
that in turn can create new possibilities for use. The
broken world thinking literature has tended to focus
on digital infrastructures and devices than speciﬁcally
on digital data (Tanweer et al., 2016). Taking up this
notion of decay and decomposition of sociotechnical
objects and introducing further perspectives from fem-
inist and vital materialism and the anthropology of
material culture oﬀers some novel ways of conceptua-
lising personal data. There are resonances here with
Haraway’s idea of humans as compost, Frost’s con-
cepts of composition and re/decomposition of
human–nonhuman assemblages, and Ingold and
Hallam’s writings on making and growing.
The scholarship of Ingold and Hallam on making
and articulation emphasises the importance to artisans
of their practices and the materials they work with
‘feeling right’. Making and articulating materials in
ways that feel right (or which meet aﬀective and sensory
judgements of what works) involves embodied learning
and doing. The comparison with the capacities of
human bones for meaning and repurposing is also
apposite here. As Hallam (2010) points out, it is far
from the case that bones, once interred, are inert and
no longer meaningful. They can be disinterred and used
for many other purposes. Like human bones, the pro-
cesses of creating their meaning may be interrupted,
broken, disrupted or lost. But this state of decay or
deadness may not be permanent. So too, personal digi-
tal data may not be useful initially, but can become
meaningful later. Like bones, they can be articulated
with other data and take on more value. In the global
digital data economy, the economic or research value of
joining up disparate datasets about individuals to
create detailed proﬁles of them has intensiﬁed. If we
adopt Haraway’s compost metaphor, even when digital
data (or bones) have decayed, they may still possess
potential vital capacities to grow new assemblages.
Digital data can be ‘cleaned’ and made more useful
or valuable, or they can be recomposed with other
data sets, again generating new meaning. They may
also reach a point where decomposition is so advanced
that repair or recomposition cannot take place.
Like bones, our personal digital data are reliquaries
of our humanity, testaments to our lived experiences
and unique identity. These data are materialisations
of selfhood that both represent elements of the self
and also require attentive labour to generate value for
those who make them. They possess biovalue, just as
body parts, cells and tissues do (Lupton, 2016b).
Personal data, in other words, can be viewed as a new
type of human remains, one that is potentially open to a
multitude of repurposing and reconﬁguring, leading to
many kinds of value for a diverse range of actors. Like
human remains, they may also lose their potency and
vibrancy, their capacity to aﬀect and be aﬀected.
Making and doing data
These theoretical explorations raise a series of key ques-
tions, namely: What data materialisations are deemed
to be true and insightful? What are not? What aspects
of bodies/selves are left out altogether in digitised prac-
tices and knowledges? What are the properties of the
data encounter that work together to render data valu-
able or useless? What are the spatial, sensory and aﬀect-
ive dimensions and entanglements of these encounters?
How do these data come to matter – or not matter?
My empirical research on self-tracking as a set of
emergent embodied and emplaced practices has found
that the data generated were artefacts of both bodily
knowledge and emotion, similarly produced through
attentive labour. My research participants often
described collecting and reviewing data about their
bodies as generating agential capacities that are
6 Big Data & Society
suﬀused with aﬀect. These data can motivate them,
encourage them to move their bodies more, persist
with weight-loss eﬀorts or self-management of chronic
conditions. The ‘numbers’ can make them feel good
if they demonstrate that people are achieving goals
set for themselves, or if the data demonstrate good
health or higher levels of ﬁtness. Positive feelings can
be generated by the buzzes, ﬂashing lights, badges and
other notiﬁcations that communicate a goal has been
achieved. Alternatively, however, biometric data can
have demoralising eﬀects, generating disappointment,
frustration, guilt and anger. Notiﬁcations can be
experienced as annoying or pestering, making unrea-
sonable demands (see Lupton, 2018a, 2018b; Lupton
and Maslen, 2018; Lupton et al., 2018; Sumartojo
et al., 2016).
These metrics can tell us only limited details about
our bodies. Just like a human bone in itself is meaning-
less, digital data by themselves mean nothing. They
only make sense in the context in which people decide
to collect their data and the social relationships and
expectations, places and spaces in which they do so.
Human data are articulated as part of sense-making,
just as human bones are. The work of making and
doing data involves people recognising the resonances
and diﬀerences of the dataﬁed forms of themselves that
are data materialisations. Articulating one’s personal
data is a matter of connecting the metrics with the
lived sensory experiences of one’s body and the other
elements that are important in data sense-making.
Articulation is therefore a form of connection of joining
disparate pieces of information together to make an
assemblage, but the work of articulation is inevitably
and invariably contextual. Choices about articulation
are context-based, and the worlds in which articulated
data assemblages move are also contextual, drawing
their meaning from these contexts and contributing to
them as well.
Experienced self-trackers know this, as they work to
make sense of these data and incorporate them into
their lives. They realise that they must improvise and
provide context to the data – otherwise the information
is meaningless. Far from passively expecting machines
to generate the data that can then be meaningfully
applied, self-trackers are agential, constantly engaging
in the work of sense-making. While some elements of
self-tracking may be automated, what can never be left
to the machines is the process of learning from one’s
data and drawing it into one’s mundane routines, prac-
tices and performances of identity. When people review
their data, they actively relate them to the contexts in
which they were generated. People consider such
aspects as the time of day, the weather, how their
bodies felt, whether they were lacking sleep, were
hungry, feeling stressed, drank too much the night
before, what place and space they were inhabiting or
moving through when the information were generated.
Thus, for example, in our study of cycling self-track-
ers using digital monitoring of their bodies or their
bicycles (Lupton et al., 2018; Pink et al., 2017b;
Sumartojo et al., 2016), we found that the cyclists
reviewed data about their rides bearing in mind such
factors as the weather conditions (including how hot or
windy it was during the ride), the traﬃc conditions, the
behaviours of other road users, whether they were nur-
sing an injury or getting over a cold and how accurate
the GPS system was in the areas they were riding in.
Each process of reviewing their data included consider-
ation of some of these factors when people were decid-
ing how valuable, important or accurate were the
metrics and other data materialisations that their
devices or apps delivered to them. Sometimes the data
were considered to be useless, because they failed to
register the correct location of the user, or they did
not properly sync to an app or platform, or because
the monitoring device was unable to register and take
account of how tired the user was from a bad night’s
sleep. In other cases, the data were considered helpful
and useful, based on factors such as the users’ previous
experiences of the ride and the data generated from
previous rides and how well the data accorded with
their bodily sensations and memories of the trip.
Researchers interested in the pedagogical dimensions
of personal data have also begun to observe that peo-
ple’s responses to their personal data are always
emplaced and embodied, building on their previous
experiences and knowledges. In their study involving
autoethnography and ethnographies of self-trackers,
for example, Fors and Pink (2017) focused on how
people learn with their data, including the ways in
which data contribute to established routines of sensing
and knowing bodies. Their research found that self-
tracking data tends to understood in relation to what
people already know and feel in and with their bodies.
Fors and Pink noted that people engaging with their
personal digital data often employ judgements of what
feels right. These judgements are complex and dynamic,
founded in personal histories but also in personal
futures. Here again, the material, sensory and social




The eﬀects of diﬀerence are a key focus of Barad’s
work. Barad (2007) critiques ‘reﬂexive practice’ as a
mode of research, as this approach attempts to ﬁx in
time and place a speciﬁc understanding. Reﬂexive prac-
tice involves identifying a materialisation of what
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is assumed to exist. In contrast, what Barad calls ‘dif-
fractive analysis’ works to identify diﬀerences and alter-
native ways of being and doing, including how
diﬀerences are made and what is excluded from deci-
sions about what matters. From this perspective, what
counts as ‘truth’ is always contingent, contextual and
emergent. Analysis is directed at identifying these
choices and the possibilities that they entail and close
oﬀ. This may involve focusing attention on how
humans and nonhumans diﬀerentiate themselves from
other phenomena. Interactions with personal data may
be viewed as one mode of such diﬀerentiation. The
digital devices and software used for self-tracking
work fundamentally to diﬀerentiate certain aspects of
embodied practices and properties from others, using
highly speciﬁc modes of measurement that tend to seek
to quantify these practices and properties and render
them more visible than other bodily attributes.
Lenz Taguchi (2012: 265) has taken up Barad’s work
to discuss the ways in which she engages with her
research data. Lenz Taguchi emphasises that research
data do not ‘speak for themselves’ (2012: 270).
Researchers must work to turn these data into coherent
narratives, which are always inevitably partial and
selective. Adopting a diﬀractive approach, she refers
to research as ‘a becoming-with data’, involving ‘trans-
corporeal engagements’ in which the researcher is
sensitised to the diﬀerent embodied ways in which she
interacts with and makes sense of her data (see also
Hultman and Lenz Taguchi, 2010). Lenz Taguchi dis-
cusses how diﬀractive analysis involves the researcher
engaging in transcorporeality, acknowledging that the
research data are entangled with the research/
researcher inextricably. She asserts that: ‘When reading
diﬀractively, I want to read with the data, understand-
ing it as a constitutive force, working with and upon me
in the event of reading it. . . This is about the uncover-
ing of a reality that already exists among the multitude
of realities already being enacted in an event’ (Lenz
Taguchi, 2012: 274–275, emphasis in the original).
This process involves making data intelligible and
knowable: organising and ordering it in a particular
way, sometimes involving aﬀective responses to the
vibrancy of data that cannot be easily described. The
researcher’s previous embodied and aﬀective experi-
ences contribute to her decisions about which data to
select and how to conﬁgure data narratives so that they
make sense to her and her audiences.
While Lenz Taguchi is here discussing her approach
to diﬀractively analysing research data, the same per-
spective can be adopted to understand how people who
engage with the personal data generated by themselves
or others. This diﬀractive process, I would argue, is
what many people do when they are engaging with
their personal digital data and making sense of it.
Indeed, acknowledging the ‘constitutive force’ of their
data is one reason why people may decide to take up
digitised self-tracking and continue with it. They recog-
nise these human–data assemblages oﬀer them new
insights into their bodies, habits and practices, insights
that can, in turn, contribute to new forms of embodi-
ment. These data both aﬀect and are aﬀected by the
humans they make and remake.
Diﬀractive analysis draws attention to events and
encounters of humans and nonhumans with each
other that evoke transformation. People engaging
with their personal data often adopt a diﬀractive
approach as they work to make sense of the data.
This is facilitated by their personal investments in the
data they are reviewing. The data are meaningful
because they are about and for them. The person enga-
ging with their data is a performative agent (Hultman
and Lenz Taguchi, 2010: 537) in an event with the data
materialisations, just as they earlier were agential
in co-creating the data with the device they used to
do this.
Our research with people who engage in self-tracking
has found that this perspective on personal data is often
expressed by people when they are explaining why they
generate these data about themselves and what the
value of the data are – in other words, how the data
‘come to matter’ (Lupton, 2017c; Lupton et al., 2018;
Lupton and Smith, 2018; Pink et al., 2017b; Sumartojo
et al., 2016). Particularly when people become aware of
the ruptures and disjunctions when they are engaging in
data sense that they move towards a more diﬀractive
position. They start to engage in the work of articulat-
ing and making sense of their data and to identify what
goes wrong or why these data don’t work to help them
in the ways they expect. They may also ﬁnd that their
data practices and sense-making bring them to a point
where they can see alternative values and uses for the
data or other ways to generate them or alternative
sources of information that work better for them and
feel more comfortable. Sensory engagements other than
the visual can be important in this process (Hultman
and Lenz Taguchi, 2010; Lupton, 2018a; Lupton and
Maslen, 2018; Pink et al., 2017a; Sumartojo et al.,
2016).
In their research investigating people’s encounters
with data about their bodies generated by medical bio-
metric machines, Gardner and Jenkins (2016) note the
aﬀective labour that is part of their sense-making. They
ﬁlmed and interviewed the participants as they inter-
acted with devices that tracked their heart rates and
brain wave frequencies, seeking to identify the ways
in which people negotiated the data generated about
them. As part of their project, Gardner and Jenkins
encouraged their participants to experiment with and
challenge these monitoring devices and the data they
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revealed about them. The participants were therefore
able to intervene in and disrupt the ‘truths’ about
their bodies the data supposedly engendered, rather
than simply accepting them at face value. Playful
experimentation worked for the participants to help
them ‘re-embody’ the visualisations of their biometric
data. They learnt how to manipulate and alter the data
by using their bodies diﬀerently. They drew on aﬀective
experiences to augment the data, conﬁguring narratives
into which the data could be inserted and made
meaningful. The participants learnt that they were not
passive actors in this encounter: they could change
the data.
These empirical studies highlight the dynamic nature
of the more-than-human world of human–data assem-
blages. They point to the sensory and embodied dimen-
sions of the ways in which humans and technologies
gather to make and do data. As performative agents,
individuals are actively engaging their bodies and minds
as they are ‘becoming-with data’ (Hultman and Lenz
Taguchi, 2010: 538). These are forms of lively imagin-
ings and interpretings, in which knowing and being
cannot be separated (Barad, 2003).
Where to from here?
In this essay, I have contended that personal data, like
other forms of mediated representations of bodies and
selves, are dynamic assemblages of humans and nonhu-
mans that are constantly subject to change. I have
sought to put forward a perspective on personal digital
data that proposes new metaphors and concepts beyond
the archetypal. This perspective on personal digital data
about human bodies allows a diﬀerent way of thinking
about the labour of making and giving meaning to this
information and the agentive capacities of personal
digital data assemblages. They are not separate entities
from people’s bodies and selves, but rather are materi-
alisations and extensions, alternative ways of knowing
and enacting bodies and selves.
Ways of thinking about data sense may productively
be expanded by acknowledging the thing-power of
digital data assemblages and directing attention to the
processes of growing, making, knowing, transforming,
composing/decomposing/recomposing, articulating and
incorporating that the work of data sense demands.
This is a new vocabulary that moves well on from
ideas of ‘data literacy’ that tend to be espoused in lit-
eratures on information sense-making. In broader
terms, bringing organic/embodied metaphors and
concepts into the discourse on digital data works
towards a greater emphasis on the inextricable aspects
of more-than-human worlds, and novel ways in which
digital technologies and the data they generate are part
of human embodiment and selfhood.
On the basis of these concepts, we can start to think
about the ways in which these liminal human–nonhu-
man artefacts change over time and the social relations
and material contexts in which they are generated and
become objects for sense-making. We can consider how
humans make and remake these digital data, and how
these data make and remake humans, and where the
congruences and frictions are, and how they are
enacted. Drawing on Barad (2014), we can begin to
explore the ways in which these correspondences are
inevitably subject to rupture and how choices are
made about which data are considered to be important
or valuable (to resonate) and which are ignored or con-
sidered useless. Living with data is a mode of being and
becoming. These data are not inscribed on bodies: they
work with and through bodies.
In addition to using the perspectives I have sug-
gested to understand data sense, there is the potential
to engage in critical and political enactments. Data
sense-making can lead to what has been described as
‘data activism’ (Milan and Velden, 2016), an approach
that seeks to uncover the ways in which people’s
personal data are used to conduct surveillance on
them without their knowledge or consent, invade their
privacy, generate proﬁts for large corporations or deli-
mit their life opportunities (Andrejevic et al., 2015;
Brunton and Nissenbaum, 2011; Kennedy and Moss,
2015; Zuboﬀ, 2015). Bennett’s and Coole’s application
of vital materialism to issues concerning political action
emphasises the ethical sensibilities that may be gener-
ated by close attentiveness to the agential capacities of
nonhumans. This includes identifying the ‘circuits
through which matter ﬂows’ (Coole, 2013: 463), includ-
ing their social structural and political dimensions as
well as the material aﬀordances of technologies.
Both Bennett and Coole identify the political possibi-
lities of such a perspective for critiquing modes of pro-
duction and consumption contributing to environmental
damage and related problems such as global warming
and food and water insecurity. Bennett (2004: 349)
discusses the importance of fostering a ‘receptivity
to thing-power’ and a consonant awareness of its
impact on ecology and implications for environmental
sustainability. Coole (2013: 465) also emphasises the
importance for such a project in devoting attention to
‘concrete studies of everyday visceral experience that
bring real material ballast to what otherwise remain
abstract studies’. Coole (2013) further calls for research
which identiﬁes the disaggregated and calibrated dimen-
sions of human ﬂesh and how these are used to generate
knowledge about humans that may be used in product-
ive or disciplining ways, engendering diﬀerent types of
agential capacities. This approach, she argues, is a form
of biopolitics, in seeking to understand the workings of
power in, through and with human bodies.
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While neither Coole nor Bennett makes direct refer-
ence to digital data about human bodies, this is clearly
a prime potential object of attention for future work on
this topic. In developing close studies of quotidian
experiences of making, doing and living with digital
data, an analysis founded on sociomaterial perspectives
from the work of the scholars I have here discussed
serves to highlight the material dimensions of human–
data assemblages as they are made, grow, enacted,
articulated and incorporated, and emphasises the inter-
twined nature of known, knower and knowing. Such an
analysis can involve both a reﬂexive analysis, focusing
on the shared tacit norms, assumptions and discourses
that underpin practices, and a diﬀractive analysis that
directs attention to what is diﬀerent or resistant,
and identifying new or alternative possibilities.
Both approaches can work towards a better under-
standing of how and in what contexts data can
assume importance and signiﬁcance in people’s lives;
and in others, lose their vitality, value and potential
for enacting change.
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